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Obshchestvennost' as Russia's indigenous term
Seken is an indigenous and a commonly used Japanese word. It expresses a type of lifeworld, like air, that exists between individual and society, and regulates the behaviours of almost all Japanese people. Seken, a sort of invisible force which restricts people's individual freedom, underlies the well-ordered Japanese society that was allegedly preserved even in the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on 11 March 2011. In search of a new approach to analysing the distinctiveness of Japanese society, some scholars have focused on this indigenous term at the exclusion of western-originated, yet widely used terms such as civil society, public sphere and others. 1 A similar approach may be applicable to Russia, which started to modernise at almost exactly the same time as Japan, in the middle of the nineteenth century. In so doing, obshchestvennost', a derivative term of obshchestvo (society), is a unique word rooted in Russian history. As the term is often considered difficult to translate directly to other Western languages, it has been replaced with various phrases in English, such as public, public sphere, public opinion, social organisations, educated society, middle class and civil society.
Against the background of the emergence of civil society and a growing debate around this phenomenon during regime change in Eastern Europe and the USSR from the end of the 1980s through the 1990s, obshchestvennost' has drawn attention from quite a few scholars who have attempted to reconsider modern and contemporary Russian history as coloured by the autocratic rule of the Tsarist and Communist regimes. Focusing on the range of voluntary associationslike circles, clubs, charitable associations, and academic and professional
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Yasuhiro Matsui organisations-that thrived in modernising Russia, rather than on state elites or people themselves, they argue for the establishment of civil society in late Tsarist Russia. 2 V. Ia. Grosul, who wrote the history of obshchestvo in Russia prior to the appearance of obshchestvennost' as both a word and reality, noted that 'Russian society as a special social organism', clearly distinguished from both the power of the state (gosudarstvo) and the people (narod), had emerged and developed under Peter's reforms at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Mainly composed of aristocrats (dvorianstvo) who had been liberated from state service, it had the character of secular and polite society. The important aspect of Grosul's remark is that it was the state and its measures that enabled the emergence of Russian society, although the trend of 'the European Enlightenment and the philosophy of rationalism' affected the process. This relationship between state and society may be characteristic of the ensuing modern history of Russia.
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While Grosul uses the term obshchestvennost' as an approximate synonym for obshchestvo, 4 Vadim Volkov, who describes a concise conceptual history of obshchestvennost' from its origins in the late eighteenth century to the Soviet period, points out that the intellectuals in the middle of the nineteenth century contrasted obshchestvennost' with obshchestvo, which was accompanied by an implication of polite society.
5 According to Volkov, obshchestvennost' carries two basic connotations: 'first, an abstract quality of "sociality" or social solidarity, and second, an active social agency, socially-active groups of people, the public'. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the word came to signify 'a certain group of people sharing a set of civic virtues' or 'a "progressive" part of society'. 6 A. S. Tumanova, a leading historian on this matter, also defines obshchestvennost' as 'an advanced and educated part of society that thinks with categories of public welfare and progress '. 7 Based on Tumanova's definition, obshchestvennost' appears to overlap with intelligentsia to a considerable extent, another word deeply rooted in Russian history. Indeed, both words, which were 'firmly built in the language of self-description of educated Russian', as distinct from the state and people, had been broadly circulating since the late nineteenth century, and enjoyed 'universal acceptance in all quarters of imperial society'. 8 In addition, each word also continued to function as a key social concept in Soviet Russia even beyond the 1917 Revolution. However, what is important here is that obshchestvennost' as 'the public' comprising 'socially active groups of people' could be conceptually broader and more flexible than intelligentsia, which was often defined as a social stratum.
In any event, the word obshchestvennost' was used and circulated to illuminate and derive an active and progressive portion of society working on a wide range of public missions. Therefore, this word should be seen as a category differentiated from society in general, as well as from both the state and the people.
Obshchestvennost' as a human group, public identity and a strategic word
Thus, if obshchestvennost' is outlined as an objective reality or human group, one can consider the proportion of Russian society it occupied. Indeed, B. N. Mironov, who has defined obshchestvennost' in his own way (such as social groups within the population, or sometimes individuals and public or status organisations and institutes that affect official power and whose opinions are considered by those in power in executing their policies), 9 puts forward the question of who the members of the obschestvennost' from the seventeenth to the beginning of the twentieth centuries were, and answered it as follows: in Muscovite Russia (Moskovskaia Rus'), obshchestvennost' were those who had rights to attend the Zemskii Sobor (assembly of the land). In 1678, they numbered 770,000, or around 8% of the total population. In 1870-1914, obshchestvennost' related to census citizens who had voting rights in the Zemstvo (an organ of rural self-government), the City Duma (assembly) and, from 1906, the State Duma. They comprised 10% of the population in 1870-1892, 7% in 1893-1905 and 16% in 1906-1917, respectively. 10 However, such statistical data alone seem insufficient to grasp the entire picture of obshchestvennost'. The term could also be said to stand out amongst the discourse and practices circulating and being performed in society. Again, Volkov's article offers numerous suggestions. Stressing that '[i]t is difficult to define concrete boundaries of obshchestvennost' and its organisational belonging', he remarks that the word 'can be employed as a discursive referent to indicate the carrier of public opinion … or as a name for some imagined collective agent of a certain concerted social action or activity'. His understanding of obshchestvennost' as a 'discursive referent' and 'imagined collective agent' is particularly important; yet Volkov also adds that obshchestvennost' 'is constituted as a correlate of communication or concerted action, and an individual can be said to be a "member" of obshchestvennost' if and as long as he or she takes part in such an action'.
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Based on these remarks, we can safely say that obshchestvennost' is a social or public identity constructed through discursive and practical activities, and distinguished from the state, society in general and narod.
12 In his memoir, V. A. Maklakov, who was a well-known lawyer, political activist in the Liberation Movement, leader of the Kadet party (Constitutional-Democratic Party) and member of the State Duma in the late Imperial period, repeatedly uses the phrase 'nasha (our) obshchestvennost'' in the context of the 1905 Revolution.
13 Thus, we also need to pay attention to citizens' self-consciousness or self-other consciousness to identify the imagined collective agent, as well as to consider objective entities.
In the political and social realities of late Imperial Russia, the making of obshchestvennost' as a new social or public identity was often inextricably linked with the process of self-organisation (samoorganizatsiia) that Tumanova emphasised as an important aspect of obshchestvennost'.
14 As Tumanova, Joseph Bradley and others illustrated with a great number of cases and examples, roughly 10,000 voluntary associations had formed in the Russian empire by the beginning of the twentieth century.
15 Around the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth century, trade unions and political parties had started to emerge. Thus, obshchestvennost' significantly increased its presence in Russian society as it encountered the political and social crisis culminating in the 1905 Revolution. Juxtaposing the state power (government) and obshchestvennost' was becoming popular among both ruling elites and counter-elites, such as the liberal intelligentsia. Maklakov, as a representative of the latter, later wrote a memoir entitled The Power and Obshchestvennost' at the Sunset of Old Russia, 16 while V. I. Gurko, as a representative of the former, subtitled his memoir Government and Obshchestvennost' under the Reign of Nicholas II in a Contemporary 's Description. 17 In this context, as Chapter 3 of this volume stresses, obshchestvennost' became a notion reflecting a strategy among counter-elites, especially those liberals who sought to depict themselves as representatives of an educated society organised against an autocratic government and bureaucracy, rather than the actual formation of social relations. In other words, the use of this notion started to be bound to a clear political goal and its appeal to active social forces. In a similar vein, Samuel Kassow, one of the editors and the author of the concluding chapter of a pioneering book using obshchestvennost' as a key concept, argues that 'The Liberation Movement had found its voice in appealing to an aroused obshchestvennost' to take its place alongside the state as the guardian of the nation's fate, and the pat juxtaposition of a creative public battling an obstructionist state remained a stock theme of certain political discourse until the revolution'.
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On the other hand, state elites may also have understood this term in a strategic manner to acquire the liberals' support in embarking on reforms for the purpose of preventing the revolution. In his memoir, Gurko, a senior officer of the Interior Ministry, described the Tsarist authorities' 'attempt to find an accommodation with obshchestvennost '' in 1904. 19 Maklakov also recollected in detail Sergei Witte's attempt at dialogue and cooperation with obshchestvennost', and its failure.
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As can be seen, obshchestvennost' was used as a discursive referent for strategic appeals conducted by political elites and counter-elites, such as liberal intellectuals who yearned for reforms, a progressive transformation of the existing regime and the emergence of a new form of state-society relation. In particular, the liberals who were identified as counter-elites and sought to transform the Tsar's regime made repeated appeals (or 'interpellations', to use Louis Althusser's word) to obshchestvennost' as a 'discursive referent' and 'imagined collective agent' to turn obshchestvennost' into an active force for progress; in other words, to let them exert their civic agency.
Based on the above review of previous research, if we grasp obshchestvennost' not only as an objective entity or a human group rooted in the historical process of Imperial Russia, but also as a social and public identity connected with social activities and voluntary associations and, further, as a notion reflecting a strategy among power elites and counter-elites who sought a new form of state-society relations derived from their visions of progress, we can reason that the word, which had taken on the flavour of the liberals, was recoined and reused by Bolshevik ideologues in post-revolutionary Russia, who sought a communist society accompanied by the withering away of the state. As is discussed in Chapter 4, the argument for the Soviet obshchestvennost' became visibly active in the course of the 1920s. One of its advocates, M. Ia. Markovich, notes that the main feature of the Soviet obshchestvennost' lay in 'not opposition, but in cooperative support to all of public projects carried out by workers' and peasants' power', while 'the prerevolutionary obshchestvennost' … was characterised by oppositional direction and atmosphere of protest against … the police-autocratic order'. 21 However, as Bradley and Kassow emphasise, if civil society, in other words, obshchestvennost', in Imperial Russia developed under the aegis of the government and 'Russian civil society was the creation of the state ', 22 closer collaboration between the state and obshchestvennost' was a basic trend. Its oppositional aspect may have been limited during the period of the 1905 Revolution and the 1917 Revolution. If this was so, the implications of obshchestvennost' may have been maintained across the divide of the Bolshevik Revolution.
Thus, the term obshchestvennost' once again stands out as a unique and effective concept that contributes to illuminating the interface between state and society, and describing various aspects of their opposition and cooperation in modern and Soviet Russia. As mentioned, previous studies have concentrated more on the late Imperial period, to a considerable extent ignoring the Soviet period, especially from the 1930s onward, although there are a few studies dealing with the NEP (New Economic Policy) period 23 -in which several associations from the pre-revolutionary period survived and the renaissance of Soviet obshchestvennost' started-and with the Khrushchev era, when a notable revival of this term was observed. 24 The only exception is the short essay by Volkov mentioned above, and even this could not thoroughly cover the phenomenon in all eras, owing to length restrictions.
This volume is an attempt to reconsider the inextricable link between state and society in modern and contemporary Russia during a period of approximately 100 years, spanning from the latter half of the nineteenth century to late socialism, in a coherent manner, based on the concept of obshchestvennost'.
Obshchestvennost' and civil society: interface between state and society
This introduction has established Volkov's article, 'Obshchestvennost': Russia's Lost Concept of Civil Society', as the basis for the argument of its conceptual history, and quoted several remarks from Bradley and Tumanova, who stressed that a type of civil society had been established in late Imperial Russia. It may have led readers to the understanding that this book regards civil society and obshchestvennost' as the same concept. That both concepts are not the same goes without saying, although many of their aspects overlap. Historically, or according to an interpretation extending from Hegel to Marx, civil society originating in Europe matured in the context of enlarging free economic activity that ruled out the state's arbitrary interference. Therefore, civil society initially meant bourgeois society. Conversely, the Russian indigenous term, obshchestvennost', had been coined and circulated mainly as a concept indicative of an 'imagined collective agent' for transforming an autocratic regime over the course of the nineteenth century. If the words of Isaiah Berlin are used, the former is a concept connected with 'negative liberty' while the latter with 'positive liberty'. 25 The difference appears to be attributable to the prolonged Tsarist autocracy and the particularities of modernisation in Russia.
However, it is also crucial that the concept of civil society itself is complex and multifaceted. If civil society is considered to mean formal independence from the state, obshchestvennost' is clearly distinguishable from civil society, except during a limited period in late Imperial Russia. On the other hand, as Bradley rightly indicated in his book, the concept of civil society has embraced another set of arguments emphasising 'partnership' between civil society and state and 'the subservience of the former to the latter'.
26 This trend appears to have been re-evaluated in the wake of the 'retreat' of the state and the promotion, under or after neoliberalism, of outsourcing public services to private companies and citizens' voluntary work. As was often advocated during Tony Blair's administration, active citizenship that emerged in such forms as NGOs and NPOs and partnerships with governments have become a new framework for discussing relationships between the state and civil society, observable in academia and public spheres in other developed countries, including Japan. Nikolas Rose, a British social and political theorist, termed a type of government that incorporates active citizenship into its mechanism 'advanced liberalism'. Under advanced liberalism, the tasks of government are allocated 'between the political apparatus, "intermediate associations", professionals, economic actors, communities and private citizens', which represent a 'diagram of government'. Rose also stresses that '[c]ivil society, conceptually and historically, was linked to the state within a particular schema for the exercise of political power'. 27 The discussion here relates to the issue of the binary framework 'state and society' set up in the subtitle of the book as well. Using this framework, the book focuses more on the interface, or on their cross-border aspects. Therefore, this volume is not inclined to interpret the relation between state and society simply as a binary relation between the ruler and the ruled. Rather, it may be adequate to refer to Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality, 'art of government', on which Rose also relied. Referring to steering a ship, Foucault argues that government is 'the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end'. In particular, he stresses that 'practices of government are … multifarious and concern many kinds of people', in other words, various actors. 28 In the context of this book, both the various apparatuses
